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1. The public consultation organised by the Council of Europe in order to ascertain the 
reactions of all parties concerned to the idea of modernising Convention 108 met with great 
success. The Secretariat of the Council of Europe received numerous contributions, most of 
which were detailed and backed up by arguments and analyses based on the expertise or 
practical experience of the contributors. Moreover, some of the latter joined forces and 
presented a joint response to the questionnaire, while certain federations or groups 
expressed their opinion on behalf of all their members. 
 
2. Every kind of background was represented in the replies – the public sector (governmental 
authorities, data protection authorities etc.), the private sector (the worlds of banking, 
insurance, electronic commerce, marketing, audiovisual distribution, socio-economic 
research etc.), and the academic world and interested associations. 
 
3. There was also a geographic spread. Replies came from various parts of Europe, and not 
only from European Union countries but also from states outside it such as Albania and 
Ukraine. It is interesting to compare the replies from states covered by the European data 
protection directive (European Union area) with those from north America (United States 
and Canada), Africa (Senegal, Mauritius) and Australia. The International Organisation of La 





4. The replies received sometimes suggest a direction to be followed but do not indicate the 
means of giving practical effect to that approach. Sometimes, by contrast, commentators 
present arguments and pointers to one or other direction. 
 
5. In a number of cases, contributors state that in view of the difficulty of the matter,  an in-
depth study ought to be carried out. This was said, for example, about the exclusion from 
the scope of the Convention of data processing for personal and household purposes or on 
the question of the law applicable. In other cases, contributors call for an impact analysis or 
a study of the effectiveness of the legislative measures envisaged (in particular concerning 
the introduction of the possibility of class actions and systems of alternative dispute 
resolution, or concerning the introduction of a duty to report data breaches). 
 
6. A great many contributors argue that the work of modernising the Convention should be 
carried out from a concern to achieve the greatest possible consistency with the protection 
rules laid down by the European Union (mainly Directive 95/46). Thus in many cases replies 
were guided by this concern to align the text of the Convention with that of the European 
directive. The work of modernising that directive, currently in progress, should be monitored 
so as to ensure that discrepancies between the texts do not arise. It is interesting to note 
that this concern is voiced not only by persons from the European Union: it is shared by 




Object and scope of the Convention, definitions 
 
1. Convention 108 has been drafted in a “technologi cally neutral” approach which keeps it 
general and simple: can this still be the case or s hould a more detailed text be prepared ? 
 
7. All those who replied were in favour of keeping the text simple and setting out general 
principles. 
 
8. In their opinion, this is the only approach which guarantees the long-term viability of the 
Convention. The past thirty years, with a convention laying down general principles, have 
shown that this model has stood the test of time. 
 
9. In the same long-term perspective, everyone likewise emphasises the need to ensure the 
technologically neutral nature of the Convention. The principles formulated must not focus 
on the existence of a technology, for that would incur the twofold risk that the principles 
might become obsolete once the technology is outdated or abandoned, and that the 
principles would not be adaptable to the new technologies that will inevitablyemerge. 
 
10. That being said, the replies state that, while the text of the Convention should not be made 
too detailed, it is nonetheless necessary to make some additions to the existing text. 
 
11. Several contributors draw attention to the fact that, if the Convention is to have universal 
validity in the future, it must be realised that too detailed a text will undoubtedly scare away 
states which might be considering accession to the Convention. 
 
12. Consequently, some commentators take the view that the existing approach should be 
pursued – keeping the text of the Convention general and simple, and setting out the 
general principles in detail in specific texts (Committee of Ministers recommendations). 
 
 
2. Should Convention 108 give a definition of the r ight to data protection and privacy? 
 
13. Some of those who replied to this question believe that including definitions of the right to 
data protection and the right to respect for privacy would help to clarify the scope of the text 
and help the public to understand its subject-matter. In the view of APEP (the Spanish 
Professional Association for Privacy), this would make it clear that private life and data 
protection are two different rights, and that personal data may or may not be private. 
 
14. Others consider that, as the concept of privacy appears in several international legal 
instruments, it would not be opportune to define it in Convention 108. In particular, it is the 
responsibility of the European Court of Human Rights to define the scope of this concept as 
set down in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The CNIL, for example, 
considers that these concepts should not be defined but left open to interpretation in an 
evolutive way. The State Data Protection Inspectorate of Lithuania points out that the 
international legal instruments which protect private life do not give any definition of it. The 
same approach could be adopted with regard to data protection. 
 
15. Let us note in passing that a non-uniform perception of what privacy means is discernible in 
the replies.  Some of them refer to the conventional meaning (intimacy, confidentiality), not 
the more developed one of autonomy and information control as updated by the European 
Court of Human Rights. The European Banking Association, which believes that Convention 
108 should contain the definitions in question, also states that this is particularly important in 
so far as the Convention is to serve as a basis for countries outside the European Economic 
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Area, which do not have specific definitions in their own legislation or any knowledge of the 
concepts of “privacy” and “data protection” in case-law and doctrine in relation to existing 
European definitions. 
 
16. On the other hand, with regard to the concept of the right to data protection, these and other 
contributors appreciate the value of a definition while calling for its harmonisation with the 
one given in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Privacy 
International emphasises in this connection that it is worthwhile trying to define the right to 
data protection, in view of the fact that many of the world’s constitutions have begun to 
recognise that data protection is indeed a right. 
 
17. Some replies argue that defining concepts after 30 years’ application of the text is not 
justified. That length of time brings an opposite response from Portugal’s Direcçao Geral da 
Politica de Justiça, which considers that, as the oldest instrument of public international law 
on the matter, Convention 108, which claims to regulate data protection law, must not 
demonstrate an inability to define that right itself. 
 
18. The European Newspaper Publishers Association does not state its opinion on the 
desirability of including such definitions, but says that, if the decision is taken in favour of 
definition, care should be taken not to make the inference that these rights would prevail 




3. Convention 108 protects against privacy intrusio ns by private and public authorities, 
including law enforcement agencies. Should this com prehensive approach be retained? 
 
19. There is unanimous agreement that an approach which covers both the private sector and 
the whole of the public sector, including police and justice system, must be maintained. 
Given the practical ease and potential of existing technical tools (not to mention those that 
will emerge in future), it is considered “absolutely vital”, to quote many contributors, that law 
enforcement personnel be required to respect data protection principles. 
 
20. Of course, everyone agrees on the need to adapt these principles to allow for needs arising 
from the work of these players. The important thing is not to leave the police and justice 
system outside the protection sphere. The solution generally envisaged is a series of partial 
exceptions for these players. 
 
21. TechAmerica Europe proposes that thought be given to situations in which partly different 
rules would apply to public authorities and private entities, while keeping the same basic 
principles and requirements as to transparency. They ask for consideration to be given to 
the impact which changes to the Convention might have on the work of law enforcement in 
order to check that these new measures or new concepts do not give rise to particular 
difficulties in this sector. 
 
22. Another American contributor asks for special care to ensure that any change made to the 
Convention continues to allow of a degree of flexibility in exchanges of “police” data 
between the United States and Europe and permits data sharing for purposes of public 
safety and prosecution of offences. 
 
23. The Canadian contributors emphasise that their experience of two separate sets of rules for 
the public and private sectors, as at federal level in Canada, has given rise to criticisms from 
civil society and from the Federal Privacy Commissioner. 
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4. Convention 108 does not exclude from its scope d ata processed by a natural person in 
the course of a purely personal or household activi ty. Should this continue to be the case or 
should a specific exception be introduced (and spec ifically considered in the context of Web 
2.0.)? 
 
24. Generally speaking, those who replied are in favour of introducing an exception to the scope 
of the Convention for data processed for personal or household purposes. 
 
25. Many of them stress that this must be done in a concern to align the Convention’s protection 
model with that of Directive 95/46. 
 
26. However, several contributors think it will be extremely difficult to decide exactly what such 
an exception would cover. 
 
27. The AEDH, which is in favour of this exception, proposes making it conditional on data not 
being communicated to third parties and that the exception goes hand in hand with an 
obligation on services supporting such personal activities (electronic mail, address book, 
diary, archive service etc.) to inform their clients about their obligations and offer them 
confidentiality functions. 
 
28. The CNIL suggests following the European Union model and stating that it lies within the 
power of interpretation of the national supervisory authorities to define what comes under 
the exception and what does not. 
 
29. The CIPPIC (Canada) observes that this question was mentioned as being a future 
challenge in the data protection field. At all events, there must be careful balancing with the 
right to freedom of expression when it comes to settling this question of individuals’ private 
activities. It was precisely when giving consideration to freedom of expression as against 
data protection that the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies developed its standpoint on this 
exception hypothesis. Realising that many of the situations in which personal data are 
processed in the most intrusive and unwarranted way are the result of private individuals 
motivated by non-commercial reasons, the Centre does not wish these activities to be 
excluded from the scope of all protection rules. In its opinion, a better solution would be, first 
to ensure that such individual activities can benefit fully from a new and broader clause on 
freedom of expression, and then to impose on individuals just some of the obligations of file 
controllers, determined in a clear, proportionate manner. 
 
30. The European Privacy Association, whose views on this point are shared by the APEP (the 
Spanish Professional Association for Privacy) and by the State Data Protection Inspectorate 
of Lithuania, points out that the activities of individuals nowadays may easily harm others 
and therefore their activities cannot be wholly excluded from data protection rules. On the 
other hand, however, purely personal activities cannot be made subject to disproportionate 
obligations and burdens, especially in relation to security (Article 7) and transborder flows 
(Article 12). The APEP stresses that regulations must be able to sanction the misuse of 
personal data by individuals. This association would consider it disproportionate to place 
obligations on individuals such as having to declare data processing, to provide information 
in accordance with Articles 10 and 11 of Directive 95/46, to take security measures or to 
ensure that such measures are being taken by the platform they are using. 
 
31. Senegal’s Data Protection Commission suggests that, over and beyond the proposed 
exception, which it supports, it be broadened by the addition of “processing of data not 
intended for systematic communication to third parties or for distribution”. 
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5. The definition of automatic processing does not include the collection of data: is it a 
problem if collection is subject to a special provi sion? Is it enough? Should other 
operations be added to the existing list? 
 
32. All who replied favour including the concept of collection in that of automatic processing. 
This stance is motivated primarily by the desire to ensure consistency with European, 
national and international standards. There is also the belief that it is useful for collection to 
be made subject to all the principles governing data processing, not just to one particular 
provision. 
 
33. The concern for consistency among legal systems also explains why many contributors, 
such as CEA Insurers of Europe or the AFME BBA (banking & financial services), call for 
the adoption of the concept of “processing” as presented in the European directive. The 
CEA considers that it would be helpful for the “disclosure by transmission” operation, which 
is a fundamental operation in data processing, to be expressly included in the list of 
operations covered. The CNIL believes that the concept of processing should be as broad 
as possible, so great is the tendency for operations carried out on data to grow in number 
and diversity. 
 
34. The AFME BBA, like the European Banking Federation, points out that the terminology must 
not be confined to such concepts as “file” which have a dated technological connotation that 
could compromise both the neutrality of the text and the broad application of the 
Convention, as this notion is no longer relevant in the present-day Internet and cloud 
computing situation. 
 
35. Lastly, the Portuguese Direcçao Geral da Politica de Justiça asks us to reflect on the 
broadening of the scope of the Convention to include non-automatic processing. That body 
is aware that such processing is a minority today, but considers that it has not entirely 
disappeared and that prudence requires its inclusion in the sphere of protection. 
 
 
The definition of the controller of the file should  be reviewed: should several criteria be 
listed, should such criteria be cumulative, can the re be several controllers for one file ? 
 
36. Some contributors think that the current version of the Convention should not be amended 
on this point. The present definitions are sufficient to render the persons involved in data 
protection responsible. 
 
37. Others believe that the definition of “responsable du traitement/data controller” used in 
Directive 95/46 should be substituted for that of “controller of the file”. 
 
38. The Data Protection Commissioner of Mauritius proposes replacing the definition by the 
following one: “The controller of the file is any natural or legal person, whether public or 
private, who decides on any activity, whether automated or not, carried out on personal 
data”. The APEP - Spanish Professional Association for Privacy proposes that the definition 
be amended to include “any person or persons who has/have the de facto right to decide on 
the purpose and means of processing personal data, either by virtue of the law or in 
accordance with a contractual agreement with the person concerned or a third party”. That 
body considers it important, for reasons of legal certainty, that only persons having legal 
personality should be responsible for processing. 
 
39. Several replies observe that it would be desirable to allow for cases in which there are 
several persons responsible for processing the same data. The AEDH quotes the example 
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of a decision to use a file taken by a number of responsible persons for joint purposes, such 
as compiling a file common to a trade or profession in relation to defaulting customers. The 
APEP draws a distinction between joint controllers (processing the same data for the same 
purpose) and several controllers (processing the same data but for different purposes). 
 
40. The European Privacy Association draws attention to the fact that advanced technologies 
(such as cloud) are increasingly resulting in the automated processing of data by multiple 
agencies.  This association believes it is important, not to state the names and functions of 
those agencies but to define the processing activities, the requirements and obligations 
linked to those activities and the related responsibilities. This view is shared by the 
Information Commissioner for the United Kingdom (ICUK), who says that, rather than listing 
the criteria for what constitutes a “controller”, he would prefer there to be a better description 
of the activities which a file controller may carry out. 
 
41. EFAMRO ESOMAR (research sector) thinks it necessary to introduce a clearer definition of 
“data controller”, laying responsibility on the shoulders of the persons who decide how data 
are to be processed, as distinct from those who control a particular computer system or file. 
This would make just one data of the file responsible for assessing the need to process data 
and the security of the available systems before opting to process data using such systems. 
It would also provide citizens with a single focus of responsibility and accountability. 
 
42. The German Insurance Association would welcome a review of the concept of file controller, 
because it would present an opportunity to make changes in data processing in the world of 
business. Centralisation of service tasks within groups and recourse to outsourcing of tasks 
to competent services are the principal areas concerned. Being able to present the entity 
transferring data and the one receiving them jointly as a single entity responsible for 
processing would facilitate data transfer and simplify group life. 
 
43. That standpoint echoes a remark made by the Computer Law and Security Review 
consortium, the International Association of IT Lawyers and the Institute for Law and the 
Web (University of Southampton): they point out that in a network environment, the concept 
of controller of the file is no longer as relevant as before, because of the increasing use of 
systems of data sharing and interconnection.  In such environments, it would be preferable 
to appoint a single entity to take overall responsibility (as in the European Union systems of 
binding corporate rules). An obligation should be placed on those responsible for individual 
processing to inform the persons concerned of any data sharing and interconnection 
involving them and provide particulars of the coordinating entity. 
 
44. Lastly, Mydex Community Interest Company states – and says that its view is shared by 
many others, including the World Economic Forum – that in future, the technical 
architectures of future generations will place individuals at the centre of their own personal 
data ecosystems, so that they will themselves take responsibility for processing. The 





6. New definitions may be necessary, such as for th e sub-contractor or the manufacturer of 
technical equipment. 
 
45. Contributors welcome the intention to introduce new definitions if it is done in a concern for 
consistency with those developed in the European Union. That would make it possible to 
improve legal certainty, enhance the protection of the persons concerned and avoid creating 
confusion in the minds of controllers of the file. 
 
46. Several replies wisely observe that there is no point in including definitions of additional 
players if a particular legal regime setting out obligations is attached to these new players. 
 
47. Several replies state that it is essential to add a definition of sub-contractor. The Italian 
Garante per la protezione dei dati personali further observes that the need to introduce such 
a definition has already been felt in several Council of Europe instruments 
(Recommendation 2002(9) on data protection in the insurance sector and Recommendation 
2010(13) on profiling). 
 
48. By contrast, Privacy International considers that the concept of sub-contractor is no longer 
useful, since sub-contractors in fact have to comply with so many obligations in respect of 
security and respect for privacy that their role becomes very hard to identify. There is a 
problem in asking controllers to take responsibility for privacy and security measures when 
they are in reality entirely dependent on the contractual conditions laid down by service 
providers (especially cloud) who are not subject to the regulations. 
 
49. The German Insurance Association calls for a flexible definition here, permitting the parent 
company, depending on circumstances, to be appointed as sub-contractor by a company in 
the group, though in such cases there should be limits on recognising the right to issue 
instructions in accordance with existing law. 
 
50. The AEDH proposes that a distinction be made in the case of service providers processing 
data on behalf of the data controller of the file but enjoying clear autonomy in the provision 
of the service, so that they would wear the two hats – that of data controller of the file and 
that of sub-contractor. In this hypothesis one could introduce the concept of “person 
entrusted” with processing (“personne chargée”): where the sub-contractor acts strictly on 
behalf of and on the instructions of the data controller of the file and is not responsible as 
controller of the file, the person entrusted with processing could be regarded as bearing part 
of the responsibility, either jointly or in full. 
 
51. In the opinion of the ICUK, the mere distinction between controller of the file and sub-
contractor no longer reflects the complex relationship which exists between organisations 
processing personal data. The model definitions in Directive 95/46 correspond to a passive 
sub-contractor acting only on the instructions of the controller, whereas in reality the person 
regarded as sub-contractor may have considerable influence on the manner in which 
processing takes place and may, in many respects, act as a controller of the file. The CNIL 
considers that this situation, in which actual day-to-day processing of data is in effect, 
increasingly, in the hands of the sub-contractor, not of the data controller of the file, 
ultimately requires that this category of player be defined. That body believes that 
consistency with the definition in the directive stating that it is the organisation acting on 
behalf of the data controller of the file is necessary. It also argues that the rules governing 




52. Regarding the addition of a definition of “manufacturer of technical equipment”, some 
contributors such as the European Banking Association see this as a good idea, while the 
AEDH regards it as quite essential, whether the equipment in question is hardware or 
software. The Cyberspace Law and Policy Centre (Australia), in common with the Cyprus 
Commissioner for Personal Data Protection and the CLSR-IAITL-ILAWS consortium, 
observe that this will prove to be necessary if rules on “Privacy by Design” are introduced – 
which, unlike the others, the Cypriot authority would not welcome. 
 
53. The Italian Garante has a less clear-cut approach: it believes that it would undoubtedly be 
useful to set out the guarantees which should be offered by any additional entity which plays 
any part in processing (such as a manufacturer of technical equipment), while placing the 
legal obligation to check that these guarantees are respected on the data controller of the 
file. 
 
54. Privacy International, on the other hand, thinks it would not be wise to define equipment 
manufacturers beyond a specific risk to privacy and a security context. The Direcçao Geral 
da Politica de Justiça in Portugal is also opposed to the inclusion of this concept, which it 




7. New principles could be added to the Convention,  such as the proportionality principle, 
which should apply to all operations carried out on  data. Such a principle is also linked to 
the data minimisation principle which aims at limit ing the collection of personal data to a 
strict minimum or even to cease personal data colle ction whenever possible. 
 
55. Many contributors point out that the proportionality principle is already contained in Article 5 
of the Convention. They accordingly restrict the application of this principle to data which 
must be relevant and not excessive. 
 
56. Other contributors think that the inclusion of the principles of proportionality and 
minimisation or limitation of data collection in the protection principles should be 
recommended, and some argue that these principles should be explicitly stated, not merely 
implied. The explicit formulation of these principles would make it possible to define their 
scope better and more precisely. In particular, it would make it possible to stipulate that the 
proportionality principle applies to all operations, not just to data collection (Cyprus 
Commissioner). In other words, the proportionality principle linked to the purpose of each 
processing operation (Garante) or the criterion in respect of the non-excessive character of 
an entire private data processing project relative to the fundamental freedoms and rights in 
question must be respected, in addition to the need to minimise the data processed 
(AEDH). Similarly, the AEDH says that the principle of data minimisation must not replace 
that of proportionality because the latter must go beyond data alone. 
 
57. Some contributors are strongly in favour of including these principles, which they see as 
very important (CLPC, Australia; APEP - Spanish Professional Association for Privacy; 
Czech Office for Personal Data Protection; CLSR-IAITL-ILAWS; Italian Garante). 
 
58. Morpho-Groupe Safran (identification technologies), which regards the proportionality 
principle as one “which seeks to strike a balance between the processing of data and the 
aim pursued”, is mistrustful of the subjective approach implied by the application of this 
principle. That subjectivity results in divergences between national data protection 
authorities in the acceptance or otherwise of an industrial product or device. Consequently, 
they would like this principle, if it is set forth in the Convention, to be accompanied by 
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objective provisions such as to encourage recourse to labelling/certification procedures 
based on precise criteria which the manufacturer would have to respect in order to develop 
his products. 
 
59. The GDD (German data protection and data security association) considers that certain 
advantages should be granted to organisations using pseudonyms rather than data directly 
linked to persons. 
 
60. ARD and ZDF (radio and television) consider that, whereas users of traditional media have 
always enjoyed complete anonymity, that is no longer true of services provided via the 
Internet. Consequently, they strongly support the principle of strictly limiting data collection 
to the aim pursued. 
 




8. Should the question of consent be considered in close connection with the principle of 
transparency and obligation to inform, or as a nece ssary condition for  fair and lawful 
processing, to be met before any other step? 
 
62. Several contributors believe that the role of consent as the legal basis for data processing 
should be qualified. In any case, it ought not to be the sole basis. Some believe it should not 
be presented at all as a condition to be met for processing to be legal and fair. In many 
cases the persons who give consent do not realise what they are agreeing to. Consent is 
neither a guarantee of protection for the persons concerned nor a practicable solution for 
data controllers of the file, for whom it may constitute a disproportionate burden (for 
example in the worlds of marketing or insurance). 
 
63. Quality of consent causes huge apprehension. There are references to problems of 
genuinely free consent, and problems arising from the form of consent increasingly 
employed. 
 
64. On this point, the GDD (German data protection and data security association) considers 
that the relevant German law offers consumers good protection. It stipulates that if consent 
is given in a form other than writing, the data controller of the file must give written 
confirmation of the substance of that consent to the person concerned, unless consent was 
given in electronic form, in which case the controller must keep a record of the consent to 
which the person concerned must have access and which he/she can revoke at any time 
with future effect. 
 
65. The CLPC (Australia) proposes the example of the Canadian law governing protection of 
privacy in the private sector (PPIDEPA). There is a particularly interesting proposed 
amendment to that legislation: “An individual’s consent is valid only if it may reasonably be 
expected that the individual understands the nature, purpose and consequences of the 
collection, utilisation or disclosure of the personal information to which he/she consents”. 
The CLPC says that, if the concept of consent is introduced, consent must be expressly 
defined as free, informed and revocable and not linked to other consents. There should also 
be a general principle stating that, where true consent is a realistic option, it should 
constitute the main basis of legitimate processing, which would be consistent with the 
overall aim of transparency in the processing of personal data. 
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66. The US Federal Trade Commission points out that denying the persons concerned the 
choice of practices which are straightforward for consumers makes it possible to restore 
meaning to choices about more problematic practices (such as transferring their data to 
third parties who have no connection with the purpose of the data processing). 
 
67. Many contributors stress that consent must be linked to transparency. In the opinion of 
Privacy International, transparency must even prevail over consent, in the sense that prime 
importance must attach to clear, easily found and easily understood information provided for 
the persons concerned before judging whether processing is authorised (and then based on 
opt-out rather than opt-in). Furthermore, other contributors stress that one should be wary of 
long and rarely read privacy policies. For the APEP - Spanish Professional Association for 
Privacy believes that a general duty of information should be established in order to ensure 
transparency. 
 
68. The European Newspaper Publishers Association and the FAEP (European Federation of 
Magazine Publishers) point out that an exception for the media would be needed for any 
question of consent, whether in terms of an obligation of transparency and information or as 
a necessary condition for fair, lawful processing. This must apply to all their activities - 
archiving of articles, recording of research material for preparation of articles, everyday 
collection of news, investigation, verification, publishing, deletion, whether or not this leads 
to publication of the material, and lastly subsequent publication and communication. 
 
 
9. Should the legitimacy of processing be addressed  by Convention 108 as Directive 95/46 
does in its Article 7?  
 
69. Some contributors fear that the introduction of such a list would reduce the flexibility of the 
Convention (TechAmerica). The Garante, like the Cyprus Commissioner for Personal Data 
Protection and CEA Insurers of Europe, emphasises that one should avoid modelling the 
Convention’s principles too closely on those set out in Directive 95/46, since that would 
mean introducing excessively detailed provisions into the Convention. This concern is 
shared by the German Insurance Association, which argues in favour of a high degree of 
abstraction in the Convention, especially bearing in mind third countries’ wish to accede. 
Similarly, the FEDMA states that this ought not to appear in the substance of an 
international convention. It would be more appropriate to a directive. 
 
70. Privacy International is more radical still, considering that such an approach to legitimacy is 
redundant and pointless. Dishonest aims are obviously not legitimate, unless they are (sic) 
(hypothesis of aiming to deceive a fraudster, for example). As they see it, the list of reasons 
for legitimising processing set out in the directive has created a playground for lawyers, 
strewn with pitfalls. Finally, they fear that a list of positive bases for carrying out data 
processing will inevitably be incomplete. They see the combination of the requirement of 
fairness and lawfulness (= not “unlawful”), coupled with the other general principles of 
proportionality, data minimisation and non-intrusive collection as appropriate criteria. These 
last points are restated word for word by the Cyberspace Law and Policy Centre and the 
CLSR-IAITL-ILAWS consortium. 
 
71. At the other end of the spectrum, some contributors find it opportune, useful, and indeed 
important, to include such a list of legitimate bases, out of a concern for consistency with 
European Union law or a concern for clarity for those in the field who need to have clear 
parameters on lawful processing (AEDH, European Privacy Association, European Banking 
Federation, Data Industry Platform, the Czech Office for Personal Data Protection, the 
Bulgarian Personal Data Protection Commission, the Portuguese Direcçao Geral da Politica 
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de Justiça, the Ministry of Justice of the United Kingdom). EFAMRO and ESOMAR  are in 
favour of the introduction of a basis for legitimate data processing into the Convention, but 
not of an exhaustive list of legitimate bases. 
 
 
10. Convention 108 does not expressly mention the n eed for compatibility between the use 
made of data and the initial purpose of collection.  In today’s context, personal data are 
commonly used for purposes that go far beyond what may have been initially foreseen, 
hence the issue of compatibility. 
 
72. Few contributors understood the pertinence of this question, since Article 5 of the 
Convention already requires that data should not be used in a manner that is incompatible 
with the purposes. For many people, therefore, the question has already been settled. 
 
73. However, some of them observe that the question of later processing arises more and more 
often, mainly owing to the mass availability of data on the Net, and should be dealt with. 
 
74. The European Privacy Association believes that the main issue is not to mention the 
requirement of compatibility with purpose but rather to extend the scope of Article 5 (b) of 
the Convention to all data processing. They suggest taking the text of Article 6.1 b) of the 
directive as a model. 
 
75. It is pointed out that later processing for historical, statistical or scientific purposes should be 
permitted. EFAMRO and ESOMAR call for “market, social and opinion research” not to be 
regarded as incompatible with the initial purpose of data processing, and this is already 
allowed by Recommendation R(97)18. These bodies call for the inclusion in the Convention 
of a provision similar to Article 6 paragraph 1 b) of Directive 95/46. 
 
76. CEA Insurers of Europe ask that it be possible to change the purpose in cases where the 
new purpose can be legally justified. 
 
77. Matthias Pocs, considering this question from the standpoint of the police where it arises in 
an acute form, proposes (and supports his proposal with factual arguments) that Convention 
108 should provide for the processing of personal data for purposes other than the specified 
ones to be prohibited if the person concerned is suspected of a lesser or moderately serious 
offence, but permitted if the person concerned is suspected of a serious criminal offence 
and adequate guarantees against infringements of human dignity are given. 
 
 
11. Special categories of data which enjoy enhanced  protection are defined very widely, 
which could lead to excessive application of this r estrictive regime : are the data sensitive 
or their processing? Should other categories of dat a be added such as (national) 
identification numbers and biological or biometric data, etc.? 
 
78. Relevance of a category of sensitive data:  the UK Ministry of Justice requests the 
Consultative Committee to reflect on the possibility of sensitive data being linked to their use 
rather than simply extending the list of sensitive data (he refers to the example of a 
photograph which might be regarded as biometric data, and where there is a huge 
difference between its being attached to a library ticket and being taken at the door of a 
treatment centre for drug addicts). This viewpoint is shared by several contributors for whom 
data sensitivity is essentially a matter of context. 
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79. In the view of several contributors, the proportionality principle offers adequate safeguards 
for these data. One could leave the present list as it stands and rely on the proportionality 
principle to counter the dangers arising from other data. 
 
80. The Italian Garante considers that the greater protection afforded to data in the present list, 
which broadly corresponds to the categories protected by international instruments to 
combat discrimination, should be left untouched. On the other hand, one might envisage a 
“functional” criterion whereby additional categories of data could be classed as sensitive 
because of the context and/or purpose and/or processing mechanisms. In these cases, 
such data would be subject to enhanced protection. One could also envisage circumstances 
and data categories being determined and regularly updated by flexible tools not involving 
amendments to the Convention. This viewpoint accords with that of the Data Protection 
Commissioner for Mauritius, who considers that a distinction could be drawn between data 
that are sensitive by reason of their nature and data that are sensitive by reason of the 
processing applied to them (such as a name or photograph revealing racial origin). The 
APEP also emphasises that any prejudice which might result from the processing of these 
sensitive data depends on the purpose of processing. 
 
81. The list of sensitive data:  several contributors wonder what is covered by the concept of 
“biological” data. Some consider that it should not cover such characteristics as gender or 
age, which are apparent to everybody. 
 
82. Some replies suggest that genetic and biometric data be added to the list. 
 
83. Morpho-Groupe Safran, a company specialising in identification and applications using 
biometry, points out that, unlike names, fingerprints give no clue as to ethnic origin or 
supposed religious allegiance. Moreover, a name is the key giving access to masses of 
information on the Internet via search engines, as distinct from fingerprints. So the company 
wonders why biometric data should be subject to more binding legal rules when they 
provide less information than people’s names. Moreover, Safran wonders what should be 
done about “voice prints” obtained from electronic messaging and stored on servers to build 
biometric databases. Should these data enjoy different legal rules from fingerprints, and on 
what basis?  Safran gives information about genetic fingerprints as distinct from genetic 
data and points out that in some situations the use of biometric data such as iris recognition 
or digital fingerprints, if rendered anonymous, makes it possible to decide whether an 
individual may or may not be granted a right (to enter, for example) without his/her identity 
being disclosed. 
 
84. The APEP - Spanish Professional Association for Privacy shares this reluctance to have 
biometric data regarded as sensitive, since in principle these data do not relate to 
information about health. This association also finds it difficult to class (national) 
identification numbers as sensitive. 
 
85. In the view of the AEDH, apart from biological information needed in a medical context, the 
question arises whether, in the name of protection of the human person, information such 
as national identity numbers and biological or biometric data which serve as reliable 
identifiers for a person should actually exist at all, especially when they relate to every 
member of a community, not just to certain persons for particular reasons of public 
necessity. This organisation regards the existence of such information systems as highly 
dangerous in all exceptional circumstances (regimes becoming undemocratic). 
Furthermore, these systems which physically link persons to the state breach the social 
contract and stem from the idea that every citizen is a potential delinquent, which is 
unacceptable. So data of this kind must not be made subject to a system of enhanced 
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protection in order to prevent discrimination. What is needed is a system of prohibition 
which can be lifted in accordance with the criteria set out in Article 9 of the Convention. 
 
86. The CNIL proposes referring to ethnic origin rather than racial origin. 
 
87. Several contributors request that, if consideration is given to extending the list of sensitive 
data, this be preceded by an impact study. 
 
88. Regarding the rules governing these data , the CNIL requests that they be more detailed, 
because the contents of the Convention as it now stands lack precision. It also says that an 
exception should be made for statistical processing and scientific research. 
 
89. EFAMRO and ESOMAR would welcome clarification on what the term “sensitive data” 
covers. They also point out that insisting on recourse to an authority before sensitive data 
are allowed to be processed places too heavy a burden and too great a barrier on the 
research sector. 
 
90. The European Newspaper Publishers Association and the FAEP call for an exemption for 
the press sector from the strict rules on sensitive data. 
 
 
12. Specific protection could also be applied to ce rtain categories of data subjects. In 
particular, children may need specific protection b ecause of their vulnerability. Is there a 
need for specific provisions regarding the protecti on of children? If so, what are the issues 
that should be addressed in such provisions? 
 
91. Data concerning minors should not fall into the sensitive data category, since the person 
concerned by the data cannot constitute a sensitivity criterion (Bulgarian Personal Data 
Protection Commission). 
 
92. That being said, it is important to provide for special conditions for the protection of minors 
because of their vulnerability. Several contributors consider this necessary. The APEP - 
Spanish Professional Association for Privacy observes that there is unanimous agreement 
that children deserve specific protection, but the discussion is about the relevant age to be 
taken into account, whether and from what point parental control infringes the child’s right to 
privacy, who is to grant parental authority, etc. Specific obligations should be imposed in 
cases where children are the target of the processing. The specific protection regime should 
be based on obligations as to means, not results. 
 
93. The Federal Trade Commission outlines the specific American on-line system of child 
protection (the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act), which lays down a series of rules 
designed to protect children below the age of 13. These rules are currently being reviewed 
to ensure that they continue to offer an adequate response to changing technologies, and 
especially to practices involving a boom in the use of mobile terminals and interactive 
games by children. 
 
94. By contrast, many contributors do not believe that a particular protection regime has its 
place in the Convention. Specific rules are set down in other instruments. A 
recommendation would probably be more appropriate here. Alternatively, the explanatory 
report could make it clear that the introduction of the principles of proportionality and 
minimisation is an adequate response to the concerns about children - and other vulnerable 
groups (CLPC, Australia). 
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95. This is all the more so because there are difficulties in harmonising the meaning of “minor”, 
“minor with capacity of discernment” and “minor with capacity to express consent”. Just as 
there are difficulties in verifying and ensuring compliance with age limits on the Internet. 
 
96. Lastly, several contributors point out that there are other categories of vulnerable persons 
apart from minors. 
 
 
13. Article 7 of the Convention addresses security in a narrow sense, namely as protection 
against accidental or unauthorised destruction, acc idental loss and unauthorised access, 
alteration or dissemination. Should the notion of s ecurity also include a right for data 
subjects to be informed of data security breaches? 
 
97. Several contributors think it desirable to provide for such a right to be informed about  
security breaches, applicable across the board to all sectors. The CLPC, together with the 
CLSR-IAITL-ILAWS consortium and Privacy International, believe that this right should not 
appear as part of the principle of security but as a separate principle. 
 
98. Most replies state that is is imperative for the limits of such a right to be clearly indicated. 
The European Privacy Association says that the text should stipulate when the information 
is to be given, to whom and in what manner. TechAmerica Europe proposes markers to 
define this obligation. The Data Protection Commission of Senegal considers that there 
should be an obligation to inform the public supervisory authorities but not the persons 
concerned, who are in any case powerless in the face of infringements. The German 
Insurance Association offers the benefit of German experience: in 2009, an amendment to 
German data protection legislation introduced a duty to inform in cases of unauthorised 
access to data. That obligation applies where particularly sensitive data are concerned and 
where there is a real risk of serious infringement of the legitimate rights or interests of the 
persons concerned. To their knowledge, this rule has proved positive in practice. They 
stress the need to limit this kind of obligation strictly to cases of real risk to the persons 
concerned. Morpho-Groupe Safran does not deal with hypothetical case of unauthorised 
access but considers that this right to be informed of security breaches should be expressly 
justified by the need to protect identity and limit the risks of usurpation of identity. 
 
99. However, several contributors fear that it would not be possible to introduce such a right 
without transforming the Convention into an unduly detailed instrument going beyond 
general principles. 
 
100. Some contributors, such as the Czech Office for Personal Data Protection, are 
opposed to the idea of introducing this right, believing that the question is sufficiently dealt 
with in the European directive. The Data Industry Platform fears that additional burdens may 
be placed on agencies in the field without giving the persons concerned a higher level of 
protection. This group of signatories appreciates the importance of security and the need to 
create confidence among the persons concerned and data controllers. Thus they are 
sympathetic to the concept to the extent that it is an incentive to security. However, they 
consider that the question would be more suitably addressed by instruments of self-
regulation. FEDMA and the European Banking Federation express exactly the same fears 
and convictions. EMOTA (European E-commerce and Mail Order Trade Association) also 
shares these misgivings. 
 
101. Several contributors state that in any event one should not fall for an “overly 
prescriptive” wording, which would impose an excessive burden and at the same time rob 
the measure of its effect, making notification of those concerned routine. 
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102. Garante sees the question of security as crucial, especially in the context of cloud 
computing. Article 7 of the Convention should be revised. It would be appropriate to 
consider extending the concept of security to include the security of data transmission 
networks, over and above the physical security of the premises where data are kept. 
 
103. Similarly, Privacy International recommends that the passive interpretation of “data 
security” be replaced by a positive obligation to design systems in such a way as to 
minimise the risk to privacy - for example ex ante minimisation. So one must not only seek 




14. There are special risks arising from the use of  traffic and location data (technical data 
accompanying a communication) since such data can r eveal movements, orientations, 
preferences and associations with others. Do we nee d special rules for the use of such data 
? 
 
104. There are contrasting replies to this question. 
 
105. Some contributors think it would be desirable to provide for a stronger protection 
 regime for processing aimed at locating individuals spatially. 
 
106. The AEDH observes that traffic data affect freedom of communication, and location 
 data freedom to come and go. Because of this interference with freedoms, a more 
 stringent regime should be applied to them. The same is true of requests made on a 
 search engine, which affect freedom of information. Similarly, Privacy International 
 sees traffic and location data as data concerning social relations and impinging on 
 freedom of association and the right to associate freely, in a private, unobserved 
 way. Consequently, Privacy International takes the view that such data should 
 constitute a special category and be considered as inherently “toxic” to privacy. 
 
107. The CNIL points out that placing these data in the sensitive category could well 
 place a check on certain technical innovations. It would be better to add clearly 
 distinctive protection elements to the Convention, designed in particular to require 
 appropriate guarantees for “personal data used in processing for the purpose of 
 revealing an individual’s spatial position”. That would make it possible to exclude 
 data which may reveal an individual’s position but whose purpose is not to do so, 
 while not placing these data in the special categories provided for in Article 6 of the 
 Convention. A third possible option suggested by the CNIL would be to propose a 
 specific right not to be geo-located. 
 
108. Other contributors see no need to provide for specific rules. The British Information 
 Commissioner likewise believes that sensitivity relates more to data processing and t
 he effects it may have on individuals rather than to the nature of the data processed. 
 
109. The CLPC, echoed by the CIPPIC, argues that there should be no need for a 
 particular regime if care is taken to ensure that traffic and location data are brought 
 within the definition of personal data, stating explicitly that “personal data” covers 
 any information which permits or facilitates communication with a person on an 
 individualised basis, whether or not that information conforms to the present 
 definition of personal data. 
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15. Should accountability mechanisms and an obligat ion to demonstrate that effective 
measures have been taken in order to ensure full co mpliance with data protection rules be 
introduced? 
 
110. Most of those who replied to this question favour the idea of introducing an 
obligation to comply with the accountability principle as a guarantee of improving the 
protection afforded.  Accountability mechanisms should be clearly defined; they 
should not be excessive and should be implemented by all signatories in the same 
way. 
 
111. Privacy International, in common with the CLSR-IAITL-ILAWS consortium, advises 
caution with regard to the suggestion made by some contributors that accountability 
should be seen as an alternative to the requirement of respect for the protection 
rules. Accountability must not become an alternative to restrictions on the export of 
data. This organisation is concerned about the consequences, or rather the absence 
of consequences, which accountability failures may have if this principle is 
interpreted loosely. 
 
112. The APEP - Spanish Professional Association for Privacy considers that a “reward” 
(for example a lesser penalty) should go to file controllers who are “accountable” in 
cases where data protection infringements are due solely to an exceptional error. 
 
113. TechAmerica Europe supports the introduction of an accountability principle if it is 
defined in an ex post approach based on the application of the rules rather than an 
ex ante approach based on conformity with the rules. In an ex-post system, 
organisations are responsible for what they do with data wherever the latter go, 
instead of simply trying to comply with the law. This has implications for the way in 
which the organisation sees data protection, the way in which it implements it and 
the way in which it oversees it. 
 
114. Some contributors are opposed to the introduction of an obligation to demonstrate 




16. Should the principle of “privacy by design”, wh ich aims at addressing data protection 
concerns at the stage of conception of a product, s ervice or information system, be 
introduced? 
 
115. In view of the fact that the principle of privacy by design has been proclaimed by 
several bodies, was the subject of a resolution adopted by the 32nd international 
conference of data protection authorities and is being taken into account by the 
European Commission in the framework of its revision of Directive 95/46, it seems 
logical that this principle should also be enshrined in Convention 108 (Safran). 
 
116. Other contributors share the belief that this principle should be expressly 
encouraged, even if it will be difficult to give it operational effect by way of a specific 
rule (Privacy International, British Ministry of Justice, CNIL, Senegal’s Data 
Protection Commission). Or else they say it is welcome, but the way in which it is to 
be defined and implemented must be clarified before it can really be advocated 
(TechAmerica Europe). Introduction of the privacy by design principle would foster a 
proactive approach to protection rather than reliance solely on corrective measures 
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(Garante). As the AEDH sees it, the obligation to apply protection principles from the 
stage of design of equipment and applications could be simply stated in the text 
without necessarily employing a “marketing vocabulary” such as that of privacy by 
design. The ICUK observes that this principle is already implied by the existing 
protection principles. However, an explicit requirement would have the advantage of 
sending a clear signal to data systems designers, those who supply them and those 
who operate them. 
 
117. The Italian Garante points out, however, that the effectiveness of the principle 
cannot be guaranteed except by specifying how its impact on particular processing 
operations can or should be measured and by whom, in the light of specific 
technological provisions. 
 
118. The Bulgarian Personal Data Protection Commission considers that, for this principle 
to be applied effectively, data controllers should be required to carry out 
assessments of the risk to privacy in data processing. Privacy International also 
favours an obligation to carry out a privacy impact assessment for major projects. 
 
119. The last-mentioned organisation says that the simplest way of expressing the 
principle of privacy by design is to state that, if scientific discoveries show that a 
service can be offered in practice by a method which is more respectful of privacy, 
the adoption of advanced protection technologies may be made mandatory. It also 
observes that one must not be influenced by the false rhetoric of lobbyists who 
attempt to confine privacy by design to a mere state of mind, an awareness of the 
principles of data protection when commercial products are designed, “immunising” 
the concept against any technical obligations. 
 
120. According to TechAmerica, privacy by design is a process which organisations 
should follow at the start of a project and re-assess at regular intervals in order to 
check that data protection and security measures are still appropriate. It is important 
that, whatever requirement is laid down in the legal instrument, it remains a matter of 
procedures, not technology. The AFME BBA (banking) considers that the wording of 
the principle must be high-level and not prescriptive with regard to the measures to 
be adopted. 
 
121. For its part, the FTC recommends in its report designed to improve protection of 
privacy in the United States that firms should adopt a privacy by design approach. 
This means constructing privacy protection mechanisms as part of day-to-day 
business practices. This protection includes the provision of reasonable security for 
personal data, limits on data collection to necessary data only and conservation  of 
data for a limited period of time. On the basis of its own experience, the FTC 
encourages the Consultative Committee under Convention 108 to adapt the concept 




Rights – Obligations 
 
17. The right of access should not be limited to da ta but should cover access to the origin of 
the data, i.e. who was at the origin of the communi cation. Should this right also cover 
access to the logic of the processing? 
 
122. Adding the right of access to the origin of the data and to the logic underlying 
processing is absolutely necessary in the opinion of the AEDH, very important in the 
opinion of the Bulgarian Commission, and achieves consistency with the European 
Union rules in that of the ICUK and the British Ministry of Justice: the CIPPIC and 
the Garante consider it necessary in the growing context of the complex IT models 
on which criteria and assumptions are made, with potentially negative effects on 
individual privacy; and other replies state simply that it must be envisaged. The 
European Privacy Association fears, however, that given the involvement of large 
numbers of players in automated processing today, the obligation of transparency of 
processing - which the association supports - may not be achievable without 
excessive cost. 
 
123. The AFME BBA (banking) supports the move provided it does not go beyond the 
right introduced by Directive 95/46, in so far as it would not mean obliging the 
persons concerned to keep information about data sources and entails only the duty 
to transmit the information about sources where they are known. On the question of 
keeping information about data sources, the reply of the German Insurance 
Association states that German data protection law contains an obligation to keep 
data about sources and recipients of data for a period of two years. 
 
124. Portugal’s Direcçao Geral da Politica de Justiça considers that access to processing 
logic requires that the data subject demonstrate an interest and must be limited to 
the extent strictly necessary to satisfy that interest. Thus access to processing logic 
must not translate into unwarranted disclosure of business secrets. 
 
125. CEA Insurers of Europe points out that some requests for access are frivolous and 
seek only to check the processing of data rather than verify the accuracy of the data 
processed. Consequently, this group believes that the right of access should be 
limited and that introduction into Convention 108 of a right of access to the logic 
should not be envisaged. This stance is shared by the Data Industry Platform, which 
is anxious to preserve commercial secrets, companies’ competitiveness and their 
intellectual property. Internal predictive analysis techniques are of crucial value to 
the business world and should not be disclosed to third parties. The FEDMA shares 
this view. 
 
126. Privacy International considers that the protection secured to intellectual property 
(patents) permits transparency without fear. In exceptional cases where secrecy 
must be preserved, the supervisory authorities should be allowed confidential 
access to the algorithms in order to check their legitimacy. 
 
127. The FTC provides information about cases in the United States in which consumers 
are entitled to obtain information from firms which have taken action with negative 
consequences for them. One case illustrates the possibility of achieving a 
compromise between transparency and business secrecy: credit reporting agencies 
are not required to reveal exactly how credit ratings are calculated, but the 
disclosure required of them must include the range of possible credit ratings in the 
assessment model and the key factors negatively affecting the consumer’s rating. 
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128. The CNIL insists that the exercise of access, opposition, correction and blocking 
rights must be free of charge. 
 
129. The Garante invites the Committee to reflect, where technologies based on cloud 
computing are concerned, on the introduction of a right to know the physical location 
and the country where data are kept or where distribution servers are situated. 
 
 
18. The right of opposition is justified in cases w here the data processing is not based on 
the data subject’s consent. The link between the ri ght of opposition and the right to oblivion 
could be examined, as well as means to guarantee re spect for, and exercise of, this right. 
 
The right of opposition 
 
130. The right of opposition is justified in the opinion of most contributors, but not in all 
circumstances. One might consider introducing this right into the Convention for 
reasons of consistency with the directive. Some replies (others disagree) state that 
this right should be granted even where processing is based on consent, if it is 
admitted that consent can be revoked in all circumstances.  
 
131. A similar right exists in Canadian law (PIPEDA), permitting the persons concerned to 
object by way of opt-out to collection, utilisation and communication of personal data 
for non-necessary purposes. 
 
132. The Bulgarian Commission stresses that the link between the right of opposition and 
the right of oblivion consists in the right of opposition being exercised taking account 
of the purpose of processing, whereas the right of oblivion is exercised irrespective 
of the justification of processing in relation to purpose. 
 
The right of oblivion 
 
133. The following picture emerges from most of the replies. The right of oblivion may be 
particularly indicated and practicable in certain circumstances (mainly in the 
framework of social networks). Otherwise it is problematic in several respects: 
 
134. - It conflicts with the rights, interests and freedoms of others, in particular 
freedom of expression, freedom of the press (it impinges on the conservation of full 
archives), the duty of memory, business continuity, management of employee files, 
the duty to keep evidence, etc. It is a hindrance to historical research. It may also 
hamper the provision of certain services such as medical treatment in cases where 
the medical history of the person concerned is not known; 
 
135. - It is difficult to implement once the data have been rendered public on the 
Internet. 
 
136. In the opinion of the APEP, the right of oblivion is not a sub-category of the right of 
opposition in so far as, unlike the latter, it has retroactive effect. So the question is 
whether individuals must be responsible sine die for their past actions and whether it 




137. Some contributors favour its inclusion in the Convention. Others - more numerous - 
consider that further reflection is needed before a decision is taken, giving thought in 
particular to the practical obstacles to its implementation and clarifying the cost and 
practical implications of including such a right. Clarification should be forthcoming 
about the data which would be the subject of such a right of erasure: if it concerns 
data obtained from the person concerned, does it also cover analytical data or meta-
data created by the data controller of the file?  It is stressed that the right of oblivion 
cannot be absolute in any case. The Data Industry Platform points out that this right 
should not appear in a list of general principles tested over a period of time. On this 
point, it is supported by the Garante, which does not look favourably on the inclusion 
of so controversial a right in the Convention. 
 
138. The Data Industry Platform argues that, if the inclusion of this right were to be 
envisaged, it should imperatively be limited to services based on data which the 
individuals concerned have themselves supplied and which are made accessible to 
third parties as part of the service. Some other replies echo this standpoint, limiting 
the scope of such a right to social networks. 
 
139. Yet others, lastly, regard this right as utterly unrealistic both technically and legally 
(EMOTA - European E-commerce and Mail Order Trade Association) or as having 
disastrous consequences for publishers and freedom of expression (European 
Newspaper Publishers Association et European Federation of Magazine Publishers) 
and say it should be dismissed absolutely (a stance taken especially by the various 
contributors from the press sector). 
 
 
19. Should there be a right guaranteeing the confid entiality and integrity of information 
systems? 
 
140. It should be noted that many contributors omitted to reply to this question. 
 
141. Some replies were positive, but in most cases not backed up by arguments. Among 
them, the Garante stands out by stating that, in its view, the rights concerned in this 
question, like those covered by the following questions, are those which most justify 
the Convention’s list of rights and general principles. 
 
142. However, other contributors fail to see on what grounds the confidentiality and 
integrity of systems should be the subject of a right, instead of strengthening the 
security constraints set out in Article 7. The extra value of such a right remains to be 
demonstrated and should be set against the risk of dilution and loss of legibility of 
the rights enshrined in the Convention. 
 
143. The Czech Office for Personal Data Protection observes that the guarantee of 




20. Should a right ‘not to be tracked’ (RFID tags) be introduced? 
 
144. Some contributors agree with the idea of introducing such a right, subject to 
reasonable exceptions. 
 
145. The Garante, commenting on the three rights referred to in questions 19, 20 and 21, 
considers this right essential. 
 
146. Other contributors say that further consideration is called for. 
 
147. The AEDH and the Data Industry Platform think that application of the general 
protection principles (in particular the prohibition on keeping data for longer than the 
aim requires) provides a satisfactory answer. Similarly, the CIPPIC believes that the 
principles of “confidentiality, privacy and accuracy” ensure this right. The CLPC also 
believes that there is no need to lay down a separate right if personal data are 
defined in such a way as to encompass information about an individual’s 
communications, location or behaviour. 
 
148. The European Privacy Association suggests that, rather than a right not to be 
tracked, there should be an option not to be tracked. The persons concerned should 
be informed about tracking practices and be given the option and the technical 
means of refusing to be traced/located. The APEP also refers to an option to be 
made available to the persons concerned, rejecting the idea of a prohibition. 
Tracking technologies are not bad in themselves, but certain uses must be limited in 
cases where privacy must prevail. The association argues that the tracing of 
Alzheimer patients, lost luggage, vehicles, children or animals should not be 
prevented. Moreover, the concept of tracking is not limited to RFID but also covers 
cookies in particular. 
 
149. Several contributors observe that a right must not be based on a targeted 
technology, which would run counter to the aim of preserving the technologically 
neutral character of the Convention. 
 




21. Should users of information and communication t echnologies have a right to remain 
anonymous? 
 
151. The Garante, commenting on the three rights referred to in questions 19, 20 and 21, 
considers this right essential. 
 
152. The AEDH observes that social life is based on a dialectic of identification and 
anonymity that is no longer found in present-day conditions where, for example, 
consultation of public information leaves identifying traces, just like any form of 
payment, since there is no electronic currency equivalent to banknotes. This 
constitutes a “basic defect”. In such a context, everything rests on the length of time 
for which data collected are kept. In this association’s opinion, there should be social 
and technical guarantees of the right to anonymity. 
 
153. Similarly, the CIPPIC is of the opinion that anonymity is a right which deserves to be 
separately formulated and protected. The ability to act anonymously is central to the 
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protection of privacy in public and semi-public space. It points out that the wording of 
this principle as proposed by the CLPC on the basis of the provisions of Australian 
privacy legislation is interesting. The CLPC suggests the following wording: 
“Individuals must have the option of not identifying themselves when dealing with an 
entity, or of using a pseudonym, except where there is a legal obligation of 
identification or where it is not practicable for the entity to deal with individuals who 
are not identified or who use a pseudonym”.  
 
154. Several contributors are in favour of a right to anonymity provided the law is not 
infringed. 
 
155. Other contributors, on the other hand, do not think there should be a right to 
anonymity because it could lead to an increase in fraud and crime, it being difficult if 
not impossible to find the perpetrators. The European Privacy Association is 
opposed to a generic right to be absolutely anonymous when using ICTs, which 
would conflict with practical needs (individuals need information about their use of 
ICTs, at least for the purpose of billing such use) and for the requirements of law 
enforcement bodies. However, this information must be protected against misuse. 
As the EPA sees it, this protection is already secured by the Convention. The APEP 
quotes the example of an employer legitimately overseeing the actions of his 
employees for which he will be held responsible. 
 
156. The Data Industry Platform, contrary to the contributors mentioned above, inquires 
whether the off-line community really knows about default mechanisms or a right to 
remain anonymous in normal circumstances. For example, the staff of a public 
library know that library’s users and their reading preferences. The group sees no 
reason to draw a distinction between the on-line community and the off-line one. 
 
 
22. Should Convention 108 address the question how to strike the right balance between 
protection of personal data and freedom of expressi on (new notion of press and journalism 
in the context of Web 2.0.)? 
 
157. In general yes, but replies differ somewhat about the manner of doing so. 
 
158. The European Privacy Association believes that the - decisive - link which exists 
between the right of data protection and freedom of expression should be defined. A 
link with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights could be 
addressed in the preamble to Convention 108. 
 
159. In the opinion of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU-UER), Article 9. 2. b) 
together with paragraph 58 of the explanatory report is not sufficient and should be 
explicitly strengthened in order to grant a clear exemption from the application of 
certain data protection rules to journalistic activities, especially in the audio-visual 
field. That organisation accordingly proposes amending Article 9 by the addition of a 
paragraph reading: “9. 2. c) - protect the processing of personal data carried out 
solely for journalistic purposes”. The EBU regards such an amendment as vital in 
order to preserve the freedom of the media, investigative journalism and the 
confidentiality of journalists’ sources. 
 
160. The Centre for Socio-Legal Studies proposes drafting a new provision requiring the 
parties to strike a balance between the fundamental interest of freedom of 
expression and the values which data protection seeks to uphold. The provision 
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should also mention the need to adopt broad, but not absolute, exemptions from the 
protection rules for these activities. As for the possibility of expressly stipulating 
minimum exemptions in accordance with Article 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, this requires fuller consideration. The explanatory report should state 
explicitly that this provision to safeguard freedom of expression is not limited to the 
press. In principle, it should hold good for any form of public expression. 
 
161. The APEP considers that any regulations in this field must be flexible: they must 
provide criteria to serve as guidelines, but not themselves conduct a predetermined 
general assessment. By contrast, the CNIL considers that similar provisions to those 
in the French law on data processing and freedoms could be incorporated into the 
Convention. That body thinks it would be helpful to state at the European level the 
exemptions and derogations from which processing might benefit. In the CLPC’s 
opinion, it would not be appropriate for the Convention itself to weigh up all aspects 
of these conflicting interests, but it ought nonetheless to contain a provision 
recognising the public interest of freedom of expression. 
 
162. The AEDH observes that even in Europe there is no consensus on the limits to be 
set on freedom of expression in the name of protection of privacy. That association 
therefore advocates an initiative aimed at bringing standpoints and procedures 
closer together. That initiative should be taken in the Council of Europe, possibly in 
conjunction with UNESCO. 
 
163. The ICUK wonders where the line should be drawn in the age of blogging. Up to 
what point will supervisory authorities be required to regulate individuals’ behaviour 
on line? 
 
164. The Italian Garante is opposed to the inclusion in the Convention of provisions which 
might prove less flexible than what emerges from the case-law of the European 
Court of Human Rights in reconciling the two rights, or which might fail to strike the 
same balance. As for the questions linked specifically to Web 2.0, it seems 




Sanctions and remedies 
 
23. Should class actions be introduced into the Con vention? Should more scope be given to 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms? 
 
165. Class actions . Various contributors regard the introduction of class actions as 
desirable, either in certain specific contexts1  or generally, and say that this should 
be mentioned in the Convention.2  Others point out that, on the contrary, the general 
character of the Convention does not lend itself to this.3  Similarly, the question of 
sanctions and remedies ought more broadly to fall within the scope of domestic law 
rather than that of the Convention.4  Some replies also observe that the class action 
debate should take place in a broader context than that of data protection.5 
 
166. Apart from these methodological objections, there are some misgivings about the 
general introduction of class actions. Some replies state that they are not needed,6 
or even that they are inappropriate.7  It is argued that class actions are of no interest 
where the person concerned already has the benefit of protection mechanisms to 
rely on in the exercise of his/her rights8 (eg. data protection authorities). Class 
actions would be useful only when other remedies are unreliable9 or ineffective, in 
short where recourse to this remedy would be of direct practical interest.10  Others 
note that data protection disputes are specific to individuals and would therefore not 
lend themselves to class actions.11  Yet other contributors point to the risk that class 
actions would permit the harmful use of data protection rules.12  Dealing with class 
actions at this stage would also create uncertainty.13 
 
167. However that may be, the Convention could nonetheless emphasise the benefits 
and value of class actions if it did ultimately deal with the question of remedies.14  
And if recourse to class actions were envisaged, it would be above all important to 
assess the impact they might have in the European context.15 
 
                                                 
1 Opinion of the CIPPIC. 
2 Opinion of the Czech Republic's Office for Personal Data Protection; opinion of the Mauritius Data Protection 
Commissioner; opinion of the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice; opinion of the United Kingdom Information 
Commissioner's Office; opinion of the Direccao Geral da Politica de Justica. 
3 Opinion of the EPA; opinion of the Italian Garante per la protezione dei dati personali. Various contributors 
stress that this is a matter for domestic law; see, for example, the opinion of the Lithuanian State Data 
Protection Inspectorate. 
4 Opinion of the CEA. 
5 Opinion of the EBF. 
6 Opinion of the Data Industry Platform. 
7 Opinion of the ENPA-FAEP. 
8 Opinion of the German Insurance Association. See also the opinion of TechAmerica Europe, which also 
emphasises that the extent of public demand for class actions should be assessed. 
9 Opinion of the Italian Garante per la protezione dei dati personali. 
10 Opinion of the UK Ministry of Justice. 
11 Opinion of the FEDMA. 
12 Opinion of the APEP. 
13 Opinion of the EMOTA. 
14 Opinion of the Cyberspace Law and Policy Centre; opinion of CLSR-IAITL-ILAWS; opinion of Privacy 
International. 
15 Opinion of the CNIL; opinion of the UK Ministry of Justice. 
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168. ADR. Some contributors express support for recourse to ADR,16 which some regard 
as rapid and inexpensive.17  Similarly, some replies stress the potential importance of 
self-regulation in a modern data protection system.18  Some emphasise, however,  
that the question of dispute resolution by alternative methods is one that should be 
dealt with by states, not the Convention.19  Furthermore, it is a question that ought to 
be discussed in the European Union context.20  Perhaps the Convention could 
confine itself to laying down an obligation to create alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms while leaving the substance to domestic legislation.21 
 
169. Various contributors observe that if the decision is taken to resort to ADR, this 
should in any case not limit the other remedies available to the persons concerned.22  
Recourse to ADR could not then be a mandatory stage prior to any judicial remedy - 
or other remedy still involving public authority, just as it could not be the only means 
of settling disputes available to the persons concerned.23  Where ADR was resorted 
to, it could for example be recommended that existing arbitration bodies be involved 
in the application of data protection.24 
 
170. Several contributors mention the importance of the role which the data protection 
authorities  - including data protection officers - can play in settling disputes. For 
example, some consider that they could be given competence to settle disputes.25  In 
this connection they need the freedom to establish procedures, and the Convention 
could lay down a standard-setting framework for the purpose.26  For example, it 
would be appropriate to give data protection authorities the power to act ex officio.27 
They could also have the possibility of intervening freely before the ordinary and 
administrative courts dealing with current cases.28 
 
171. Other.  On a quite different subject, some contributors stress the usefulness of 
creating incentives  to respect for data protection (eg. a gradual easing of the 
administrative requirements based on the firm’s background in simply complying 
with data protection principles, or even exceeding the normal requirements).29 
 
 
                                                 
16 Opinion of the FEDMA; opinion of the UK Information Commissioner's Office; opinion of the UK Ministry of 
Justice. 
17 Opinion of the FEDMA. 
18 Opinion of the UK Information Commissioner's Office. 
19 Joint opinion of the AFME and BBA. 
20 Opinion of the CEA. 
21 Opinion of the Direccao-Geral da Politica de Justica. 
22 Opinion of the CIPPIC. 
23 Opinion of the CNIL. 
24 Opinion of the German Insurance Association. 
25 Opinion of the GDD; opinion of the UK Information Commissioner's Office. 
26 Opinion of the UK Information Commissioner's Office. 
27 Opinion of the German Insurance Association. 
28 Opinion of the CNIL. 
29 GSI in Europe. 
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The law applicable to data protection   
 
24. Should a rule determining the law applicable to  data processing (in cases where different 
jurisdictions are involved) be considered? 
 
172. General . The problem of the law applicable appears important to many contributors, 
who repeatedly recommend that the rules be clarified, particularly in the context of 
cloud computing (an example frequently cited). The problem of applicable law is 
sometimes regarded as an obstacle for organisations not based in the European 
Union, and wishing to establish processing operations there; European law would 
apply without its application being justified by a sufficiently strong link between the 
individual situation and Union law.30 However, some contributors reply that they are 
convinced that the current rules on defining the applicable law are effective.31 
 
173. The risk that arises here is a classic of private international law: either there is a risk 
of absence of protection (no law applicable) or more than one set of rules might be 
applicable.32  The replies reveal two convergent trends, both calling for greater 
harmonisation: more harmonisation of basic concepts and rules is desired, and 
greater clarity in determining the law applicable. On the latter point, a variety of 
suggestions is contained in the replies. 
 
174. Harmonisation of basic rules . It is clear that the harmonisation of national 
regulations and interpretation in accordance with the Convention would have a 
positive effect33 in so far as the question of the law applicable - as long as it is the 
law of a Council of Europe member state - would be less important if legal systems 
were harmonised. Accordingly, some contributors highlight the possibility of 
integrated harmonisation in the most global framework.34  Promotion of international 
cooperation, establishment of guidelines on data protection issues and “rules 
between states” would help resolve the difficulties currently being encountered.35  So 
concept definitions should be clarified, as should their application in the member 
states.36 
 
175. Several contributors point to the potentially universal - or global - nature of the 
Council of Europe Convention and the desirability of promoting it at international 
level as a global standard .37  Indeed, the Madrid resolution, which is universally 
accepted, could be drawn on in the drafting of certain of Convention 108’s 
principles.38  These considerations are relevant both to questions of applicability of 
national law and to cross-border data flows: the two sets of issues are clearly linked. 
 
176. Rule to determine the law applicable to data protec tion . The complex nature of 
the question of applicable law is mentioned in some of the opinions submitted, 
                                                 
30 Joint opinion of the AFMI and BBA. 
31 Opinion of the Data Industry Platform; opinion of the FEDMA. 
32 Opinion of the CNIL. 
33 See, for example, the opinion of TechAmerica Europe. 
34 GSI in Europe. 
35 Opinion of the CEA. 
36 Opinion of the EFAMRO-ESOMAR. 
37 Opinion of the AEDH; opinion of the AFAPDP and the OIF; opinion of the CNIL; opinion of Spyros Tsovilis; 
opinion of the Direccao-Geral da Politica de Justica. 
38 Opinion of the CNIL 
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particularly in such contexts as that of cloud computing.39  Some contributors stress 
that it would be a complicated matter to settle this question in the framework of the 
Convention, especially in view of the role played by the European Union in this 
connection:40 coordination is necessary.  Clearly, further thought must be given to 
the question, but perhaps the complexity of the problem would require a case-by-
case approach rather than establishing a general rule. 
 
177. Nevertheless, some contributors think that the question should be dealt with in the 
Convention41 - in conjunction with Directive 95/4642 - or in any event that this would 
be desirable,43 44 as affording better legal security. Others believe that the inclusion 
of such a provision might perhaps constitute an obstacle to possible ratification of 
Convention 108 by non-member states of the Council of Europe,45 whereas it should 
be made an attractive instrument for those states.46  The protection of data and 
privacy are highly complex and technical issues about which political debate is still 
ongoing.47  Some replies state that the Convention should lay down a general 
principle, leaving the rest to national regulations and international cooperation.48  
However, one reply says that it is simply not desirable for the Convention to decide 
the question of the law applicable to data protection.49 
 
178. However that may be, different opinions offer possible approaches to determining 
the law applicable to data protection. 
 
179. With regard to jurisdiction criteria , the replies contain different proposals. For 
example, with each state guaranteeing equivalent protection - in the context of the 
European Union, say -, an enterprise active in several of its states would be required 
to comply with only one set of regulations, that of its principal place of 
establishment.50 According to certain contributors, each state’s rules should be 
deemed equivalent.51  Generally speaking, the replies favour the application of a 
“country of origin principle”.52 
 
180. Other differences are proposed as regards jurisdiction criteria. Some contributors 
suggest that the place of establishment of the data controller of the file be taken as 
                                                 
39 See, for example, the opinion of the UK Ministry of Justice. 
40 Joint opinion of the AFME and BBA. 
41 Opinion of the Bulgarian Personal Data Protection Commission; opinion of the Cyprus Commissioner for 
Personal Data Protection; opinion of the Czech Office for Personal Data Protection; opinion of the Lithuanian 
State Data Protection Inspectorate; opinion of the Data Protection Commissioner of Mauritius; opinion of 
Mydex (point 24); opinion of the Ukraine Data Protection Authority. 
42 Opinion of the EPA; opinion of the German Insurance Association. 
43 Opinion of the CNIL; opinion of the Cyberspace Law and Policy Centre; opinion of the EBF; opinion of 
CLSR-IAITL-ILAWS; opinion of Privacy International. The T-PD should also look into the question (opinion of 
the Direccao-Geral da Politica de Justica). 
44 In the opinion of the Albanian Data Protection Commissioner, it is pointed out that the Convention should 
provide for a rule enabling the states to lay down specific rules on this. 
45 Opinion of the CNIL. 
46 Opinion of CLSR-IAITL-ILAWS. 
47 US Federal Trade Commission. 
48 Ukraine – Ministry of Justice. 
49 Opinion of the Italian Garante per la protezione dei dat personali. 
50 Opinion of the EPA. 
51 Opinion of the APEP. 
52 Opinion of the FEDMA; opinion of TechAmerica Europe. 
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the principal criterion, a secondary criterion being the place to which the data 
controller of the file specifically directs his activity.53  The direction of activities 
criterion would be one to take into account in particular when the controller of the file 
is situated outside the territory of the European Union.54  It is sometimes suggested 
that the law applicable should be that of the country where the bulk of the processing 
operations takes place or, if that cannot be determined, the law of the country where 
the controller of the file is situated.55 
 
181. By contrast, some contributors go so far as to consider that, where several 
jurisdictions are involved, “the persons concerned should be entitled to choose the 
most protective legislation in the event of problems”.56  Alternatively, that the law 
applicable to data protection should be that of the “victim”57 (the person concerned). 
This rule could possibly be seen as the principle, with exceptions being envisaged.58 
 
182. Whatever the criteria ultimately adopted, considerations to be taken into account  
in their definition are mentioned in the replies. For example, if the aim is to reduce 
the risk of “forum shopping”,59 the “compliance burdens” on enterprises should also 
be limited.60  Similarly, simplification of the rules is called for in the case of 
enterprises belonging to the same international group with cross-border activities,61 
in particular by clarifying responsibilities within such groups. 
 
183. Some replies state that any change to the rules in question should entail 
improvement in the free movement of personal data.62  Changes to the rules of 
private international law must not involve a competitive disadvantage for the internal 
(European Union) market.63  Nor should any “extra-jurisdictional reach” be 
introduced.64 In order to avoid the last-mentioned problem, it is recommended that 
account be taken of individuals’ desire to use the services of suppliers wholly outside 
the European Economic Area (EEE-EEA) and foster properly informed decision-
making.65 
 
184. On a different point, the rules determining the law applicable should not permit 
persons bringing cases against media enterprises to choose a forum where the 
protection rules are more stringent than those in the state where such enterprises 
are established, which would pose a risk to freedom of expression.66 
 
                                                 
53 Opinion of the CNIL. 
54 Opinion of the APEP. 
55 Opinion of the EPA. 
56 Opinion of the AEDH. 
57 Opinion of the Senegal Data Protection Commission. 
58 The opinion of the Direccao-Geral da Politica de Justica appears to follow this line, recommending that the 
law of the person concerned be applied where it refers to "national law". However, it emphasises that 
exceptions should certainly be provided for, especially in the context of the European Union. 
59 Opinion of the CEA. 
60 Opinion of the CEA; opinion of the EMOTA; opinion of the ENPA-FAEP; FEDMA. 
61 Opinion of the Data Industry Platform; opinion of the GDD. 
62 Joint opinion of the AFME and BBA; opinion of the Data Industry Platform; opinion of the EMOTA; opinion 
of the FEDMA. 
63 Opinion of the APEP. 
64 Joint opinion of the AFME and BBA. 
65 Joint opinion of the AFME and BBA. 
66 Opinion of the ENPA-FAEP. 
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185. A Convention provision on applicable law should not hamper the domestic protection 
afforded to consumers.67 
 
186. Account must also be taken of the fact that any change to the rules determining the 
law applicable has implications not only for “B2C” relations but also for relations 
between enterprises and governmental authorities, including law enforcement 
authorities.68 
 
187. Lastly, although the replies received often deal with the question of the law 
applicable, some of them mention criteria of competence and the need for them to 
be pragmatic. If appropriate, a distinction could be drawn between civil jurisdiction 
and criminal jurisdiction; the T-PD concerned should look into this question.69 
 
 
Data protection authorities 
 
25. How to guarantee their independence and ensure international cooperation between 
national authorities? 
 
188. Better cooperation is called for.70  Some contributors observe that cooperation 
between data protection authorities should probably be the subject of additional 
measures written into the Convention71 (others do not share that view and prefer to 
leave the problem to domestic law72): international mechanisms facilitating cross-
border cooperation in the application of data protection rights;73 mechanisms to be 
defined, such as a common forum;74 a minimum of regulation should at all events be 
stipulated.75 The aim then would be to clarify and facilitate international cooperation - 
cooperation conditions, joint action procedures - but not to impose it.76 Some 
contributors consider, on the contrary, that cooperation has to be imposed where 
problems are global.77 
 
189. It is also proposed that authorities should be able to carry out joint investigations on 
the territory of several member states - international complaints, cross-border 
controls78 - but without this jeopardising their funding.79  In this connection it is 
important to clarify the powers of authorities to take action abroad.80  Others observe 
that effort should be put into the better recognition between data protection authorities 
of the measures taken by them - including notifications.81  One contributor went so far 
as to propose the creation of a supranational authority.82 
                                                 
67 Opinion of the CIPPIC. 
68 Opinion of TechAmerica Europe. 
69 Opinion of the Direccao-Geral da Politica de Justica. 
70 Joint opinion of the AFME and BBA. 
71 Opinion of the AEDH. 
72 Opinion of CLSR-IAITL-ILAWS; opinion of Privacy International; opinion of the Ukraine Ministry of Justice. 
73 Opinion of the EBF. 
74 Opinion of the Italian Garante per la protezione dei dati personali. 
75 Opinion of the Lithuanian State Data Protection Inspectorate. 
76 Opinion of the CNIL. 
77 Opinion of the APEP. 
78 Opinion of the Bulgarian Personal Data Protection Commission; opinion of the CNIL. 
79 Opinion of the Bulgarian Personal Data Protection Commission. 
80 Opinion of the CNIL. 
81 Opinion of TechAmerica Europe. 
82 Opinion of the Senegal Data Protection Commission. 
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190. Finally, it was stated that Article 13 § 3. b) of the Convention is an obstacle to 
international cooperation between authorities because it prevents the transfer of 
personal data involved in disputed processing despite it being necessary to the 
settlement of disputes.83 
 
191. Concerning the independence of these control authorities, the Portuguese Direccao-
Geral da Politica de Justica proposes the following criteria: there must be guarantees 
that the data protection authority is not subject to instructions or conditions such as to 
hinder its independent decision-making capacity, that is to say there must be no 
interference of any kind on the part of a public or private entity; and the necessary 
resources for its functioning must be covered by the public budget. 
 
 
26. Should their role and tasks be specified? 
 
192. Yes. The AEDH observes that the additional protocol is not very explicit about the 
functions and powers of the supervisory authorities. All the examples given in the 
explanatory report deserve to be codified in the actual text of the protocol. The 
CLPC suggests that the provision be transferred to the Convention itself. 
 
193. In the view of the ICUK, clarification would be welcome in a landscape where the 
existing national authorities present a multi-coloured patchwork. Their educational 
role should in any case be kept. The CNIL considers that these authorities’ a 
posteriori role should be strengthened. The Bulgarian Commission requests that an 
excessive burden should not be placed on these authorities. The CLPC stresses one 
function in particular: the obligation of accountability, especially to the public, in 
respect of obligations to deal with complaints. The Italian Garante believes it would 
be important to clarify cooperation mechanisms between authorities, perhaps by 
envisaging specific interaction machinery or joint forums. 
 
194. In addition, in the opinion of the EPA and the APEP, their decisions should be 
mutually recognised by other states parties; this would be valuable, especially with 
regard to BCRs. The CIPPIC calls for thought to be given to making the decisions of 
supervisory authorities binding in law through the common law concept of stare 
decisis. 
 
                                                 
83 Opinion of the UK Information Commissioner's Office. 
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Transborder data flows 
 
27. The aim of Convention 108 was to reconcile effe ctive data protection with the free flow of 
information, regardless of frontiers. The Conventio n’s principles have been further 
developed in an additional protocol (CETS 181, 2001 ). In principle, an adequate level of 
protection must be ensured. 
 
 
28. Do we need to reconsider the notion of “transbo rder data flows” entirely in the Internet 
age, where data instantaneously flow across borders ? Would it be useful to establish 




29. Should there be different rules for the public and private sectors? In particular as 
regards the private sector, should more use be made  of binding corporate rules, possibly 
combined with rules on accountability of the final recipient to ensure respect for such 
rules? 
 
195. Questions concerning TDFs should be considered in parallel with the problems of 
the law applicable to data protection. One reply contained a warning: in a networking 
world, there are limits to the extent to which data flows can or should be controlled.84 
 
196. Various contributors emphasise that the current approach to the rules on transborder 
data flows is not suited to the present technological context;85  individuals involved in 
the virtual world have their data sent from one jurisdiction to another with just a few 
clicks, sometimes to a third state outside the European Union which does not 
guarantee adequate protection.86  The present approach does not work effectively, 
being burdensome to persons acting in benign fashion and ineffective for those 
acting with more malice.87 The TDF issue should be tackled more realistically.88 At 
the very least, it should be stated in the context of the Internet when such transfers 
take place;89 the concept of TDF must be clarified, or even reconsidered.90   The 
work of the APEC was mentioned on one occasion when a more workable system 
was called for.91 
 
197. Several contributors consider that “the approach in principle should not be changed” 
and that adequate protection is required.92  Similarly, regarding the requirement of 
adequate protection, it is stressed that the provisions of the additional protocol 
should be incorporated into the Convention,93 if appropriate by clarifying the rules.94  
                                                 
84 Opinion of CLSR-IAITL-ILAWS. 
85 Joint opinion of the AFME and BBA; Opinion of the Czech Office for Personal Data Protection. 
86 Opinion of TechAmerica Europe. 
87 Opinion of CLSR-IAITL-ILAWS. 
88 Opinion of the UK Information Commissioner's Office. 
89 Opinion of the Albanian Data Protection Commissioner; opinion of the Bulgarian Personal Data Protection 
Commission. 
90 Opinion of the EBF; opinion of the Italian Garante per la protzeione dei dati personali. 
91 Opinion of the US Federal Trade Commission. 
92 Opinion of the AEDH, in favour of the requirement of an adequate protection standard. See also the 
opinion of the UK Ministry of Justice. 
93 Opinion of the Cyberspace Law and Policy Centre; opinion of CLSR-IAITL-ILAWS; opinion of Privacy 
International; opinion of the Direccao-Geral da Politica de Justica. 
94 Opinion of CLSR-IAITL-ILAWS. 
 34 
By contrast, some replies call for a new legal instrument, separate from the 
Convention, containing the necessary detailed rules.95  Others observe that the 
Convention is general in character and that it is rather the responsibility of the 
member states to deal with this complex question,96 whereas national differences 
aggravate the present practical difficulties.97 
 
198. Contributors are interested in the definition of adequacy . Some believe that a list of 
minimum guarantees defining “adequate level of protection” should be drawn up,98 
possibly modelled on what is being done in the European Union.99  Some argue that 
Convention 108 should recognise explicitly the decisions on adequacy taken by the 
European Commission on the basis of Article 26 of Directive 95/46.100  However, 
others criticise what is done at the European level, emphasising that what the 
Commission demands is sometimes more a matter of equivalence that of 
adequacy;101  the Convention should reassert that only adequacy is required.102  
Thus the process could be faster and simpler.103  The Convention could make the 
assessment process more transparent and, in this context, could be at the heart of 
developing widely recognised standards.104 
 
199. More specifically, it is suggested that adequacy could be assessed on the basis of 
broad data processing sectors - the financial sector, IT sub-contracting, PNR etc. -
;105 for example, a sector could be deemed to guarantee adequate protection even if 
the country of establishment does not offer adequate protection guarantees.106  So 
adequacy should not mean a general analysis of the law of the third party state 
concerned, but should rather relate to the particular circumstances of the case, and 
in particular the controller of the file - or the sub-contractor - located in the third party 
state, the law of that state being only one factor in the analysis.107  Some replies also 
link the adequate protection principle directly to the accountability principle.108 
 
200. In the European Union context, when a third party state does not guarantee 
adequate protection, there are various tools which may nevertheless make TDFs 
possible. Some contributors call in this connection for better recognition, in the 
European Union context, of Binding Corporate Rules [BCR]  or Model Contractual 
Clauses [MCC]  so that data transfers inside an international group of companies 
subject to the same strict rules do not need specific authorisation from the data 
protection authorities;109 the rules should be simplified.110  The authorisation regime 
                                                 
95 Opinion of the Cyprus Data Protection Commissioner. 
96 Opinion of the FEDMA. 
97 Opinion of CLSR-IAITL-ILAWS. 
98 Opinion of the Albanian Data Protection Commissioner; opinion of the Bulgarian Personal Data Protection 
Commission. 
99 Opinion of the Albanian Data Protection Commissioner. 
100 Opinion of the APEP. 
101 Opinion of CLST-IAITL-ILAWS. 
102 Opinion of the UK Information Commissioner's Office. 
103 Opinion of the UK Information Commissioner's Office. 
104 Opinion of CLSR-IAITL-ILAWS. 
105 Opinion of the Albanian Data Protection Commissioner. 
106 Opinion of the UK Information Commissioner's Office. 
107 Opinion of the UK Information Commissioner's Office. The US Federal Trade Commission also notes that 
the situation of the data recipient is not taken into account; opinion of the UK Ministry of Justice, referring to 
the Madrid Declaration as a starting-point for reflection. 
108 Opinion of TechAmerica Europe; opinion of the UK information Commissioner's office. 
109 Joint opinion of the AFME and BBA. 
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poses problems of time taken and costs incurred;111 formalities should be simplified 
in cases of recourse to MCCs or BCRs approved by the authorities.112  Greater 
flexibility is moreover desired in model contract clauses which, in the European 
Union at present, for example, do not reflect the reality of cloud computing so that 
the model becomes inappropriate.113  It would also be desirable to promote TDF 
codes of conduct accepted by all authorities for the protection of the relevant data.114 
 
201. Some of those who replied consider that minimum international rules  should be 
laid down for TDFs.115  That is the purpose of the Madrid resolution, which should be 
incorporated into a binding text.116 But in all hypothetical cases where such minimum 
rules are desirable, the potential risk of a “race to the bottom” 117 should be borne in 
mind;  some replies observe that such a race would be the inevitable consequence 
of an attempt to establish global minimum rules, destroying protection of privacy in a 
cross-border context and thus making that minimum undesirable.118  Others point out 
that before thinking about global minimum standards, it is necessary to establish the 
procedural framework for their definition, involving all regions and all the parties 
concerned.119 
 
202. Finally, on another aspect of the question, the data protection officer (DPO) could 
play a part with regard to TDFs, and a European DPO might be appointed for a 
group of companies present in different European Union countries.120 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
110 Opinion of the Data Industry Platform; opinion of the EMOTA. 
111 Opinion of the German Insurance Association. 
112 Opinion of the AFCDP (p.4). 
113 Joint opinion of the AFME and BBA. 
114 Opinion of the CEA. 
115 Opinion of the CEA; opinion of the Cyprus Data Protection Commissioner; opinion of the EPA; opinion of 
the German Insurance Association; opinion of the AFCDP. 
116 Opinion of the APEP. 
117 Opinion of the CIPPIC. 
118 Opinion of the Cyberspace Law and Policy Centre; opinion of CLSR-IAITL-ILAWS; opinion of Privacy 
International. 
119 Opinion of the US Federal Trade Commission. 
120 Opinion of the AFCDP. 
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Role of the Consultative Committee 
 
30. Convention 108 established a committee to facil itate its application and, where 
necessary, to perfect it. Should the hitherto prima rily consultative role of the committee be 
strengthened? If so, which functions should be deve loped further? Standard-setting, 
dispute resolution, monitoring functions? 
 
203. Most of those who replied to this question are in favour of reinforcing the role of the 
Consultative Committee, though some think it should remain unchanged. 
 
204. The committee should evolve to become a veritable data protection authority, with 
responsibility, in its monitoring role, for identifying innovations well in advance and 
making relevant recommendations and, in its disputes resolution role, for receiving 
complaints where the parties are faced with a cross-border problem (AEDH). The 
Mauritius Data Protection Commissioner points out, with regard to disputes, that the 
national authorities and also individuals should be able to make application to this 
Committee once it becomes a binding authority. A stronger monitoring role would 
permit verification of the manner in which the Convention is implemented at national 
level and provide for action to be taken where it is poorly implemented (CNIL). Its 
role should be strengthened only in respect of supervisory functions (CEA Insurers 
of Europe), or these functions but also in the issuing of standards (Cyprus Data 
Protection Commissioner; CLSR-IAITL-ILAWS consortium), or only in issuing 
standards (European Privacy Association). The Committee should have a part to 
play in coordination of practices, experience and suggestions made by national data 
protection authorities, as well as a monitoring role in respect of international 




Role in preparing legislation  
 
205. However, care must be taken to ensure that this does not create additional burdens 
on the states parties and other national authorities. Any duplication with other 
existing supra-national bodies, and adoption of contradictory standards, must be 
avoided (ICUK). The Data Industry Platform believes there there is a real risk of 
duplication and opposes the idea of adding an extra layer to institutions which 
already exist. As they see it, standard-setting, dispute resolution and monitoring 
functions are matters for which self-regulation is the best solution. 
 
206. The Cyprus Data Protection Authority and the Italian Garante both point out that any 
strengthening of the Committee’s role will depend on the human and financial 
resources made available. The Garante therefore argues that steps should be taken 
to guarantee the availability of those resources. 
 
207. The CNIL offers a suggestion regarding the membership of the Committee. In view 
of its “absolutely essential” part in the practical architecture of the Council of Europe, 
the CNIL considers that it would be highly desirable to review its composition. Since 
the data protection authorities bear prime responsibility for the application of 
Convention 108, and because these authorities have the benefit of practical 
experience and expertise, they should be the ones to appoint representatives to the 
Committee, not the governments. The government representatives are the only 
persons present on the European Committee on Legal Cooperation, which is 
involved in drafting texts. 
 37 
 
208. The American FTC suggests that the revision of the Convention be used as an 
opportunity to think about the contribution and support which the Committee might 
seek from industry and other key players. The role and the work of the ENISA 
Permanent Stakeholder Group could be taken as an example of how to obtain 
backing and facilitate dialogue with industry about the Convention, by reason of the 
important part which that group plays in the legal framework of data protection in the 
European Union and elsewhere in the world. 
 
